Over the past two decades, fair resource allocation problems received considerable attention in a variety of application areas. While polynomial time distributed algorithms have been designed for max-min fair resource allocation, the design of distributed algorithms with convergence guarantees for the more general α−fair allocations received little attention. In this paper, we study weighted α-fair packing problems, that is, the problems of maximizing the objective functions j w j x 1−α j /(1 − α) when α = 1 and j w j ln x j when α = 1 over linear constraints Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0, where w j are positive weights and A and b are non-negative. We consider the distributed computation model that was used for packing linear programs and network utility maximization problems. Under this model, we provide a distributed algorithm for general α. The algorithm uses simple local update rules and is stateless (namely, it allows asynchronous updates, is self-stabilizing, and allows incremental and local adjustments). It converges to approximate solutions in running times that have an inverse polynomial dependence on the approximation parameter ε. The convergence time has polylogarithmic dependence on the problem size for α = 1, and a nearly-linear dependence on the number of variables for α = 1. These are the best convergence times known for these problems.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, fair resource allocation problems have received considerable attention in a variety of application areas. Perhaps the most familiar are networking applications such as Internet congestion control, rate control in software defined networks, and scheduling in wireless networks [26, 29, 38] . However, fair resource allocation has many other applications, such as those that arise in traditional operations research settings (see [9] for an overview), and in economics and game theory, as in the work by Jain and Vazirani on Eisenberg-Gale markets [16] .
While polynomial time distributed algorithms have been designed for max-min fair resource allocation problems (see e.g., [11] and the follow-up work), the design of distributed algorithms with convergence guarantees for the more general case of α−fair allocations has received very little attention. Classical control-theoretic approaches for network congestion control problems yield algorithms that are guaranteed to converge after a "finite" time [18, 20, 26, 32, 35, 38] . Nonetheless, their convergence time as a function of the input size is poorly understood.
On the other hand, significant recent progress has been made in the design of efficient distributed algorithms for linear programs with packing constraints 1 [1, 5, 6, 23, 27, 39] . Linear programming problems can be interpreted as a special case of α−fair resource allocation problems with α = 0 (see below). Therefore, a natural question arises whether distributed algorithms for the more general class of α−fair packing problems can be solved as efficiently by combining ideas from packing linear programming algorithms [1, 5, 6, 23, 27, 39] and network congestion control [18, 20, 26, 32, 35, 38] . The answer to this question is the main focus of this paper.
In general, α−fairness provides a trade-off between efficiency (sum of allocated resources) and fairness (minimum allocated resource) as a function of α: the higher the α, the better the fairness guarantees and the lower the efficiency [2, 9, 25] . According to the definition in [32] , for a vector of positive weights w and α > 0, an allocation vector x * of size n is weighted α−fair (also referred to as (w, α)−proportionally fair or (w, α)−fair), if for any alternative feasible vector x: j w j x j −x * j (x * j ) α ≤ 0. For a compact and convex feasible region, x * can be equivalently defined as a vector that solves the problem of maximizing the w−weighted sum of α−fair utilities f α (x j ), where f α (x j ) = x 1−α j /(1 − α) for α = 1 and f α (x j ) = ln(x j ) for α = 1 [32] . α−fairness subsumes three special cases: (i) α = 1 -known as proportional fairness [18] , (ii) α = 0 -a utilitarian resource allocation, i.e., f α (x j ) is linear in x j , and (iii) α → ∞ that converges to the max-min fair solution [32] , the most egalitarian resource allocation. In the bargaining theory, proportional fairness can be interpreted as a Nash solution [34] and max-min fairness corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [17] (see [9] for discussion).
We consider the problem of efficient distributed weighted α−fair packing, namely, the problem of efficiently solving max{ j w j f α (x j ) : Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0} in a distributed manner. We adopt the model of distributed computation that was used for packing linear programs [1, 5, 6, 23, 27, 36] . Under this model, an agent j controls the variable x j and has information about: (i) the j th column of the constraint matrix A, (ii) weight w j , (iii) upper bounds on global problem parameters m, n, w max , and A max , and (iv) relative slack of each constraint in which x j appears with a non-zero coefficient, in each round. We remark that this model of distributed computation is a generalization of the model considered in network congestion control problems [20] (see Section 2.3).
Our Results. We provide a unified algorithm for the general class of distributed weighted α−fair resource allocation problems subject to positive linear (packing) constraints. Similar to [1, 5] , we state the algorithm and prove the convergence results for the normalized version of the problem in the following form: max{ j w j f α (x j ) : Ax ≤ 1, x ≥ 0}, where all non-zero elements A ij of the matrix A satisfy A ij ≥ 1. Adopting such a scaled norm is without loss of generality (see Appendices A and E).
To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the fastest distributed algorithm for weighted α−fair packing problems developed to date. Our main results are summarized in the following theorem, where for technical reasons we assume that α is bounded away from 0 and 1 whenever α = 1. A more detailed statement of the results appears in Theorems 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. Theorem 1.1. (Main Results 2 ) For a given weighted α−fair packing problem max{ j w j f α (x j ) : Ax ≤ 1, x ≥ 0}, there exists a stateless and distributed algorithm (Algorithm 1) that computes: (i) a (1 + ε)−approximate solution in O( ln 4 (nmAmax) ) rounds for α = 1.
Our algorithm is stateless according to the definition by Awerbuch and Khandekar [3] [4] [5] : it starts from any initial state, the agents update the variables x j in a cooperative but uncoordinated manner, reacting only to the current state of the constraints that they can observe, and without an access to a global clock. Statelessness implies a number of desirable properties of a distributed algorithm, such as: asynchronous updates, self-stabilization, and incremental and local adjustments [3] [4] [5] . For the purpose of clear analysis, Algorithm 1 is presented in Section 3 in a non-stateless form. However, minor modifications that do not affect the analysis make this algorithm stateless (see Appendix E).
Algorithm 1 associates a dual variable y i with each constraint i, so that y i is an exponential function of the i th constraint's relative slack: y i = C · exp(κ( j A ij x j − 1)). A similar form of dual variables has been used for packing linear programming algorithms [1, 5, 6, 13, 14, 22, 37, 39] . However, due to the different objective functions, linear programs adopt C = 1, while in our case C is a function of the global input parameters α, w max , n, m, A max .
Algorithm 1 leverages non-obvious connections between a control-theoretic algorithm for network congestion control in the α = 1 case (by Kelly et al. [18] ) and a packing linear programming algorithm for the α = 0 case (by Awerbuch and Khandekar [5] ). The primal algorithm in [18] is described as a set of differential equations that guide primal updates of each variable x j proportional to the difference w j − x α j i y i A ij . 3 The dual variables y i are not fully specified, but only required to be non-negative continuous functions of j A ij x j . For the choice of dual variables y i = C · exp(κ( j A ij x j − 1)) as in our work, the Lyapunov function used for showing finite convergence time in [18] is equivalent (up to a constant additive term) to the potential function used for showing polylogarithmic convergence time of the packing linear program [5] . At the same time, the primal updates in the algorithm of [5] are similar to those from [18] : each primal variable x j is updated by a constant multiplicative factor whenever w j = x α j i y i A ij (⇔ 1 = i y i A ij in [5] ) is not approximately satisfied. Our algorithm is similar in spirit to the algorithm for packing linear programs of [5] : it maintains a primal and dual feasible solutions and updates each primal variable x j whenever a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition x α j i y i A ij = w j is not approximately satisfied. Our update rule is slightly different: we generally employ a multiplicative update, but use an additional threshold value δ j to make sure that x j does not become too small. There are significant challenges that needed to be overcome in order to obtain results for the non-linear case. One major issue is due to different KKT conditions that guide the updates of the primal variables: as already mentioned, for α−fair objectives the condition is determined by x j α · m i=1 y i A ij , while for the linear objectives [5] the equivalent term is m i=1 y i A ij . While this may seem as a minor difference, it is actually the main reason why Algorithm 1 (unlike the algorithm of [5] ) disallows any variable x j to be decreased below a fixed threshold δ j . If there were no thresholds δ j , then it would be difficult to claim that the algorithm always maintains a feasible solution; in fact, the argument used for proving Lemma 4.1 would not be valid. On the other hand, the existence of the lower threshold δ j implies that we cannot lower-bound the change in every variable by a multiplicative factor (1 ± β) -the change in the variables that decrease to δ j in some round may be very small. Non-multiplicative change in x j complicates the argument for a multiplicative increase in the potential function, and requires ideas that were not needed in [5] . Moreover, as will be discussed later, α−fair objectives for α ≥ 1 are significantly different than the linear objectives, requiring novel arguments in the proof of the algorithm's convergence.
The convergence analysis of Algorithm 1 relies on the appropriately chosen potential function that is bounded from below and from above for x j ∈ [δ j , 1] ∀j, and that increases with every primal update. A similar potential function was used for packing linear programs in [1, 5] , and (as already mentioned) is equivalent to the Lyapunov function of [18] . The main idea in the analysis is to show that whenever a solution x does not approximate well the optimal one, the potential function increases substantially.
In particular, the convergence proofs of the α < 1 and α > 1 use suitably chosen definitions of stationary intervals and stationary rounds, respectively. The stationary interval (respectively the stationary round), is roughly a time when the x j variables do not change much and is chosen so that it guarantees near-optimality of the current solution. Polylogarithmic convergence time is then obtained by showing that the potential function increases multiplicatively within any non-stationary interval (non-stationary round).
In the α = 1 case, the arguments used in the proofs of α < 1 and α > 1 cases do not apply. We are not able to obtain a polylogarithmic convergence time in the input size, mainly due to the fact that we bound the convergence time by lower-bounding the increase in the potential due to a single variable update, instead of aggregate arguments used for α < 1 and α > 1 cases.
The convergence proof of the α < 1 case follows the same line of argument as the linear programming algorithm [5] , but is not a straightforward extension of [5] . Our setting requires additional results to obtain a multiplicative increase in the potential function, and the appropriate choice of the algorithm parameters is essential to obtaining all the intermediate results. The same set of arguments does not lead to the convergence proof for the cases α = 1 and α > 1, mainly because in these two cases the function f α (x j ) is negative throughout the feasible region. More details are provided in Section 4.
Related Work. Traditionally, the literature in the area of algorithm design has mostly focused on the two limit cases of α−fair objectives: linear programming and max-min fairness. Efficient algorithms for packing linear programs have been widely studied both in centralized [14, 22, 37] and distributed [1, 5, 6, 23, 27, 39] settings. Max-min fair resource allocations have been studied in terms of various network flow problems both in centralized [8, 15, 21, 24, 28, 30] and distributed [11] settings.
Very little attention has been devoted to the design of efficient algorithms for the general class of α−fair objectives. Classical work on distributed rate control algorithms in the networking literature uses control-theoretic approach to optimize α−fair objectives. This approach has been extensively studied and applied to various network settings [18, 20, 26, 32, 35, 38] . However, it does not lead to guaranteed convergence time: the convergence results state that the algorithm converges after some "finite time" where it is unclear whether this "finite time" is polynomial as a function of the input size.
Since α−fair objectives are concave, their optimization over a region determined by linear constraints is solvable in polynomial time in centralized setting through convex programming (see, e.g, [10] ). Distributed gradient methods for network utility maximization problems such as [7, 33] can be employed to address the problem of α−fair packing. However, the convergence time of these algorithms depends on the dual gradient's Lipschitz constant to produce good approximations. This, in general, leads to a polynomial convergence time as a function of n and A max . Moreover, the algorithms in [7, 33] lack desirable properties of distributed algorithms such as asynchronous updates and self-stabilization.
Preliminaries

Weighted α-Fairness
Consider the following optimization problem with positive linear (packing) constraints:
x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) is the vector of variables, A is the m × n constraint matrix with non-negative elements, and b = (b 1 , ..., b m ) is a vector with strictly positive 4 elements. We will refer to the problem (Q α ) as the weighted α−fair packing.
The following definition and lemma introduced by Mo and Walrand [32] characterize weighted α−fair allocations. In the rest of the paper we will use the terms weighted α−fair and α−fair interchangeably. Definition 2.1. [32] Let w = (w 1 , ..., w n ) and α be positive numbers. A vector x * = (x * 1 , ..., x * n ) is weighted α-fair if it is feasible and for any other feasible vector x:
if and only if it is weighted α-fair. Notice in (Q α ) that since b i 's are strictly positive, and the partial derivative of the objective with respect to any of the variables x j goes to −∞ as x j → 0, the optimal solution will always lie in the positive orthant. Moreover, since the objective is a strictly concave function maximized over a convex region (in this case, a polytope), the optimal solution is unique and (Q α ) satisfies strong duality (see, e.g., [10] ). The same observations are true for the scaled version of the problem denoted by (P α ) and introduced in the following subsection.
Our Problem
We consider the weighted α−fair packing problem in the following normalized form:
where f α is defined by (1), w = (w 1 , ..., w n ) is a vector of positive weights, x = (x 1 , ..., x n ) is the vector of variables, A is an m × n matrix of non-negative weights, and 1 is a size-m vector of 1's. We let A max denote the maximum element of the constraint matrix A, and assume that every element A ij of A is non-negative, and moreover, that A ij ≥ 1 whenever A ij = 0. The maximum weight is denoted by w max .
We remark that considering problem (Q α ) in the normalized form (P α ) is without loss of generality: any problem (Q α ) can be scaled to the form of (P α ) by (i) dividing both sides of each inequality i by b i and (ii) working with scaled variables c · x j , where c = min{1, min {i,j:
, then x solves (Q α ). Moreover, such scaling preserves the approximation (see Appendix A).
For technical reasons, we assume that the ratio between any two weights is bounded by a constant:
w j wmax = Ω(1) and that the sum of all weights is at least a constant: W ≡ n j=1 w j = Ω(1). This is a reasonable assumption for most settings of practical interest.
Model of Distributed Computation
We adopt the same model of distributed computation as [1, 5, 6, 23, 27, 36] , described as follows. We assume that for each j ∈ {1, ..., n}, there is an agent controlling the variable x j . The agent j is assumed to have information about the following problem parameters: (i) the j th column of A, (ii) weight w j , and (iii) (an upper bound on) m, n, w max , and A max . In each round, agent j collects the relative slack 5 1 − n j=1 A ij x j of all constraints i for which A ij = 0. We note that this model of distributed computation is a generalization of the model considered in network congestion control problems [20] where a variable x j corresponds to the rate of node j, A is a 0-1 routing matrix, such that A ij = 1, if and only if a node j sends flow over link i, and b is the vector of capacities. Under this model, the knowledge about the price of each constraint corresponds to each node collecting (a function of) congestion on each link that it utilizes. Such a model was used in network utility maximization problems with α−fair objective [18] and general strongly-concave objectives [7] .
Solution Lower Bound and Duality Gap
Recall (from Section 2.1) that the optimal solution x * that solves (P α ) must lie in the positive orthant. We show in Lemma 2.3 that not only does x * lie in the positive orthant, but the minimum element of x * can be bounded from below as a function of the problem parameters. This lemma motivates the choice of parameters δ j in Algorithm 1 (presented in Section 3). The proof is provided in Appendix B. Lemma 2.3. Let x * = (x * 1 , ..., x * n ) be the optimal solution to (P α ). Then ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
is the number of non-zero elements in the i th row of the constraint matrix A, and M = min{m, n}.
Apart from the lower bound on min j x * j , another useful piece of information for understanding the intuition behind Algorithm 1 and its analysis are the KKT conditions for (P α ) and the duality gap. We will denote the Lagrange multipliers for the problem (P α ) as y = (y 1 , ..., y m ) and refer to them as "dual variables". The KKT conditions for (P α ) are (see Appendix C): n j=1
A ij x j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}, x j ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} (primal feasibility) (K1)
The duality gap for α = 1 is (see Appendix C):
while for α = 1:
5 The slack is "relative" because in a non-scaled version of the problem where one could have bi = 1, agent j would need to have information about 6 With the abuse of notation, 1 {e} is the indicator function of the expression e, i.e., equal to 1 if e holds true, and 0 otherwise.
Algorithm
The pseudocode of the algorithm that is being run at each node j is provided in Algorithm 1. The basic intuition is that the algorithm keeps KKT conditions (K1) and (K2) satisfied and works towards (approximately) satisfying the remaining two KKT conditions (K3) and (K4) to minimize the duality gap. It is clear that the algorithm can run in distributed setting described in Section 2.3. In each round, every agent j makes updates to their value x j based on the relative slack of all the constraints in which j takes part, as long as the KKT condition (K4) of agent j is not approximately satisfied. We remark that it is not necessary that agents update their values synchronously -if the updates are asynchronous, then the convergence time is measured by the number of rounds of the slowest agent.
Algorithm 1 α-Fair Resource Allocation
Initialize x j = δ j In each round of the algorithm:
1: Update prices:
Although Algorithm 1 is not stateless, it requires only minor modifications that are provided in Appendix E to become stateless. These modifications do not affect the convergence time analysis. We keep the algorithm in the current form for simplicity of the exposition and for the purpose of the analysis. To allow for self-stabilization and dynamic changes, the algorithm runs forever at all the agents. This is a standard requirement for self-stabilizing algorithms (see, e.g., [12] ). The convergence of the algorithm is, therefore, measured as the number of rounds between the round in which the algorithm starts from some feasible solution and the round in which it reaches an approximate solution, assuming that there are no hard reset events or node/constraint insertions/deletions in between. While Algorithm 1 starts from a feasible solution, we remark that (after minor modifications provided in Appendix E) even if the algorithm starts from an arbitrary (not necessarily feasible) solution, it reaches a feasible solution in time that is upper-bounded by its convergence time.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the input parameter ε that determines the approximation quality satisfies ε ≤ min{ 1 6 , 9 10α }. The parameters δ j , C, κ, γ, and β are set as follows. For technical reasons (mainly due to reinforcing dominant multiplicative updates of the variables x j ), we set the values of lower thresholds δ j below the actual lower bound of the optimal solution given by Lemma 2.3:
The constant C that multiplies the exponent in dual variables y i is chosen as C = W n j=1 δ j α . Because δ j only depends on w j and on gloabal paramters, we also have C = w j δ j α , ∀j. The parameter κ that appears in the exponent of y i 's is chosen to be κ = 1 ε ln CmAmax ε min j w j . The "absolute error" of (K4) γ is set to ε/4.
Finally, similar to [5] , we choose the value of β so that in any round the value of each
changes by a multiplicative factor of at most (1 ± γ/4). Since the maximum increase over any x j in each iteration is by a factor 1 + β, and the solution x is feasible in each iteration (see Lemma 4.1), we have that n j=1 A ij x j ≤ 1, and therefore, the maximum increase in each y i is by a factor of e κβ . A similar argument holds for the maximum decrease. Hence, the following should be satisfied:
Observing that 1 + β ≤ 1 1−β , to satisfy the first inequality it is enough to satisfy
There are two cases: 0 < α ≤ 1 and α > 1. If α ≤ 1, then:
and setting β = γ 4(κ+1) is sufficient to satisfy both inequalities. If α > 1, then:
and choosing β = γ 4(κ+α) satisfies the desired inequalities. Therefore:
Convergence Analysis
In this section, we analyze the convergence time of Algorithm 1. We will first provide some general results that hold for all α > 0, and then we will analyze the algorithm separately for three cases, depending on the value of α. For α < 1, we follow the general line of argument used in [5] to analyze packing linear programs, although several additional insights will be needed. Intuitively, this case is the most similar to the linear case because, for α < 1, f α (x j ) is "similar enough" to the linear function; e.g., in both cases the objective is equal to 0 for x j = 0, positive for x j > 0, and bounded on the interval [0, 1). We also require that α be bounded away from 0 and 1. When α is close to 0, the initial values of δ j are also close to 0, and hence, the multiplicative increase will lead to a very small progress in x j . When α approaches 1, the term 1/(1 − α) blows up, and our analysis fails. Of course, when α is 0 we can just use the algorithm of [5] , and as α approaches 1 we are close to the α = 1 case of our algorithm. The α ≥ 1 cases are more challenging, and do not follow [5] as closely. The biggest difference is that when α ≥ 1, then f α (x j ) is negative throughout the feasible region, which invalidates most of the convergence proof used in the α = 0 [5] and α ∈ (0, 1) cases. Furthermore, the argument used for showing near-optimality within stationary intervals is not valid for α ≥ 1.
For α > 1, we introduce a definition of a stationary round, and show that the negative potential function decreases multiplicatively in any non-stationary round, while the solution x in any stationary round is near-optimal. We remark that the arguments used for proving convergence in this case rely on bounding the duality gap and are significantly different from those used for proving convergence of α = 0 [5] and α ∈ (0, 1) cases. Similarly as for α < 1, we assume that α is bounded away from 1.
For α = 1, we bound the convergence time using an additive increase in the potential due to a single variable update, which leads us to a quasi-linear, rather than polylogarithmic convergence time. This case differs significantly from the previous two largely because of a different relationship between the primal objective, sum of dual variables, and
. In contrast to the other two cases, the duality gap contains a term − j ln(x j m i=1 y i (x)A ij ) (see Eq. (3)), and it is sufficient for one term x j m i=1 y i (x)A ij to be small for the duality gap to become very large. This complicates the use of an aggregate argument over a sum of terms x j i y i (x)A ij as in α = 1 cases, since it does not necessarily lead to a small duality gap. Similarly, the term x 1−α j that appears in the analysis, and that in other cases is related closely to the primal objective, in this case is just 1, which is clearly not as useful.
Feasibility and Approximate Complementary Slackness. The following two lemmas are preliminary for the convergence time analysis, and were given in a similar form in [5] . Lemma 4.1 shows that the solution x is always feasible, while Lemma 4.2 shows that after a polylogarithmic number of rounds approximate complementary slackness (KKT condition (K3)) holds in aggregate sense:
While the proofs of these two lemmas follow the same line of argument as [5] , we remark that the appropriate choice of algorithm parameters, existence of lower thresholds δ j , and the choice of sufficiently large constant 7 C in dual variables y i are essential for validity of the arguments. Proofs of Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 are provided in Appendix D.1. Lemma 4.1. In any round of the algorithm, the solution x is always feasible: it is always true that:
There exists at least one approximately tight constraint: max
Decrease of Small Variables. The following lemma is another preliminary for the convergence analysis. It shows that if there is a variable x j that decreases by less than a multiplicative factor (1 − β), i.e., x j < δ j 1−β and x j decreases, then x j must be part of at least one approximately tight constraint. This lemma will be used later to show that in any round the increase in the potential due to decrease of the "small-value" variables is dominated by the decrease of "large-value" variables, that is, the variables that decrease by a multiplicative factor (1 − β). The proof of Lemma 4.3 is provided in Appendix D.2. Lemma 4.3. If in some round there is a variable x j < δ j 1−β that decreases, then in the same round for some i with A ij = 0 it holds that:
Potential. We use the following potential function for analyzing the convergence time of the algorithm:
where f α is defined by (1) . The potential function is strictly concave, and its partial derivative with respect to any variable x j is:
The following fact (given in a similar form in [5] ), which follows directly from the Taylor series representation of concave functions, will be useful for the potential increase analysis: Fact 4.4. For a differentiable concave function f : R n → R and any two points x 0 , x 1 ∈ R n :
Using Fact 4.4 and (4), it is relatively simple to show the following result, proof of which is provided in Appendix D.3. Lemma 4.5. Throughout the course of the algorithm, the potential function Φ(x) never decreases. Letting Φ 0 , x 0 , y(x 0 ) and Φ 1 , x 1 , y(x 1 ) denote the values of Φ, x, and y before and after a round, respectively, the potential function increase is lower-bounded as:
Main Results
Our main results are summarized in the following three theorems. Notation O(.) hides polylog( 1 ε ) terms. The objective function j w j f α (x j ) is denoted by p α (x), x t denotes the solution at the beginning of round t, x * denotes the optimal solution to (P α ).
In particular, after at most
is also upper-bounded by (5) . 
rounds of the algorithm, the algorithm converges to a solution x that provides an additive 7W ε-approximation . In particular, after at most:
rounds there exists at least one round t such that the vector of variables
is upper-bounded by (7) . 
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.8
In this section, we outline the main ideas of the proof of Theorem 4.8, while the technical details are omitted and are instead provided in Appendix D.6. First, we show that in any round of the algorithm the variables that decrease by a multiplicative factor (1 − β) dominate the potential increase due to all the variables that decrease (see Lemma D.7 in Appendix D.6). This result is then used in Lemma 4.9 to show the following lower bound on the potential increase: Lemma 4.9. Let Φ 0 , x 0 , y(x 0 ) and Φ 1 , x 1 , y(x 1 ) denote the values of Φ, x, and y before and after any fixed round, respectively, and let S + = {j :
The potential increase in the round is lower-bounded as:
Observe that for α > 1 the objective function p α (x), and consequently the potential function Φ are negative for any feasible x. To yield a poly-logarithmic convergence time in n, m, A max , the idea is to show that the negative potential −Φ decreases by some multiplicative factor whenever x is not a "good" approximation to x * -the optimal solution to (P α ). This idea, combined with the fact that the potential never decreases (and therefore −Φ never increases) and with upper and lower bounds on the potential then leads to the desired convergence time.
Consider the following definition of a stationary round: Definition 4.10. (Stationary round.) A round is stationary, if both of the following conditions hold:
Otherwise, the round is non-stationary.
Recall the expression for the negative potential:
. Then using Lemma 4.9, it suffices to show that in a non-stationary round the decrease in the negative potential −Φ is a multiplicative factor of the larger of the two terms 1 α−1 j w j x j 1−α and 1 κ i y i (x). The last part of the proof is showing that the solution x that corresponds to any stationary round is close to the optimal solution. This part is done by appropriately upper-bounding the duality gap. Denoting by S + ∪ S − the set of coordinates j for which x j either increases or decreases in the observed stationary round, using Definition D.2 we show that the terms j ∈ {S + ∪ S − } contribute to the duality gap by no more than O(εα)·(−p α (x)). The terms corresponding to j / ∈ {S + ∪S − } are bounded recalling (from Algorithm 1) that for such terms
Conclusion
We presented an efficient stateless distributed algorithm for a class of α−fair packing problems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most efficient distributed algorithm for this problem. We obtained polylogarithmic convergence time in the input size for all the cases of positive fairness parameter α that are bounded away from 0 and 1. For the α = 1 case, the convergence time is quasi-linear. We conjecture that the actual convergence time for the α = 1 case should be polylogarithmic as well. However, it is an open problem to find an argument that leads to this result. Another research direction is to study if ideas developed in this paper can be used to address the open question from [19] regarding polynomial algorithms for market equilibria, where the considered optimization problem is very similar to the α−fair packing problem for α = 1. Finally, we believe that the techniques introduced in this paper can be used for addressing a broader class of distributed convex programming problems.
A Scaling Preserves Approximation
Let the α−fair allocation problem be given in the form:
w is an n−length vector of positive weights, x is the vector of variables, A is an n × m constraint matrix, and b is an m−length vector with positive entries. It is not hard to see that the assumption b i = 1 ∀i is without loss of generality, since for b i = 1 we can always divide both sides of the inequality by b i and obtain 1 on the right-hand side, since for (non-trivial) packing problems b i > 0. Therefore, we can assume that the input problem has constraints of the form A · x ≤ 1, although it may not necessarily be the case that
The remaining transformation that is performed on the input problem is:
The problem (P α ) after the scaling becomes:
which is equivalent to:
as c 1−α is a positive constant. Recall that Algorithm 1 returns an approximate solution to ( P α ). Choose the dual variables (Lagrange multipliers) in the original solution as:
and notice that
It is clear that y i 's are feasible dual solutions, since the only requirement for the duals is non-negativity.
A.1 Approximation for Proportional Fairness
Recall (from (2)) that the duality gap for a given primal-and dual-feasible x and y is given as:
Since α = 1, we have that y i = y i for all i, and using (9) , it follows that G( x, y) = G(x, y).
Since we demonstrate an additive approximation for the proportional fairness via the duality gap: y) , the same additive approximation follows for the original (non-scaled) problem.
A.2 Approximation for α-Fairness and α = 1
For α = 1, we show that the algorithm achieves a multiplicative approximation for the scaled problem.
In particular, we show that after the algorithm converges we have that:
, where x * is the optimal solution, x is the solution returned by the algorithm, and r α is a constant.
Observe that since x = c · x, we have that p α ( x * ) = c 1−α p(x * ) and p α ( x) = c 1−α p α (x). Therefore:
B Solution Lower Bound
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Fix α. Let:
For the purpose of contradiction, suppose that x * = (x * 1 , ..., x * n ) is the optimal solution to (P α ), and x * j < µ j (α) for some fixed j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
To establish the desired result, we will need to introduce additional notation. We first break the set of (the indices of) constraints of the form Ax ≤ 1 in which variable x j appears with a non-zero coefficient into two sets, U and T :
• Let U denote the set of the constraints from (P α ) that are not tight at the given optimal solution
x * , and are such that A u,j = 0 for u ∈ U . Let s u = 1 − n k=1 A uk x k denote the slack of the constraint u ∈ U .
• Let T denote the set of tight constraints from (P α ) that are such that A tj = 0 for t ∈ T . Note that since x * is assumed to be optimal, it must be T = ∅.
Let ε j = min µ j (α) − x * j , min u∈U s u /A uj . Notice that by increasing x j to x * j + ε j none of the constraints from U can be violated (although all the constraints in T will; we deal with this in what follows).
In each constraint t ∈ T , there must exist at least one variable x k such that x * k >
Select one such x k per each constraint t ∈ T , and denote by K the set of indices of selected variables. Observe that |K| ≤ |T | (≤ M ), since one x k can appear in more than one constraint.
For each k ∈ K, let T k denote the constraints in which x k is selected, and let
If we increase x j by ε j and decrease x k by ε k ∀k ∈ K, each of the constraints t ∈ T will be satisfied since, from (10) and from the fact that only one x k gets selected per constraint t ∈ T , ε j A tj − k∈K ε k A tk ≤ 0. Therefore, to construct an alternative feasible solution x ′ , we set
, and x ′ l = x * l for all the remaining coordinates l ∈ {1, ..., n}\(K ∪ {j}). Since j is the only coordinate over which x gets increased in x ′ , all the constraints Ax ′ ≤ 1 are satisfied. For x ′ to be feasible, we must have in addition that x ′ k ≥ 0 for k ∈ K. This is shown by observing that for k ∈ K:
where the second line follows from ε j ≤ µ j (α) − x * j ≤ µ j (α), and the last line follows from the choice of x k .
The last part of the proof is to show that n l=1 w l
> 0, which contradicts the initial assumption that x * is optimal, by the definition of α−fairness from Section 2.1. We have that:
Observe one fixed term from the summation (11) . From the choice of ε k 's, we know that for each ε k there exist t ∈ T such that ε k = ε j A tj A tk , and at the same time (by the choice of x k ) we have x * k > 1 n t A tk , so that
A tk nt , as A tk = 0 ⇒ A tk ≥ 1. Plugging into 12, we have:
By the initial assumption,
since it must be |K| ≤ M (= min{m, n}). From (13) and (14), we get that every term in the summation (11) is strictly positive, which implies:
and therefore x * is not optimal. Case 2. Now suppose that α > 1. Then
Therefore:
as |K| ≤ M , and A tk A tj ≤ A max (since for any i, j: 1 ≤ A ij ≤ A max ). Finally, from (12) and (15) we get that every term in the summation (11) is positive, which yields a contradiction.
C Primal, Dual, and the Duality Gap
C.1 Proportionally Fair Resource Allocation
In this section we consider (w, 1)-proportional resource allocation, often referred to as the weighted proportionally fair resource allocation. Recall that the primal is of the form:
The Lagrangian for this problem can be written as:
where y 1 , ..., y m are Lagrange multipliers, and z 1 , ..., z m are slack variables. The dual to this problem is:
where g(y) = max x,z≥0 L(x; y, z). To maximize L 1 (x; y, z), we first differentiate with respect to x j , j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
which gives:
Plugging this back into the expression for L 1 (x; y, z), and noticing that, since y i , z i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}, L 1 (x; y, z) is maximized for z i = 0, we get that:
.., n}, and n j=1 w j = W . Let p 1 (x) = n j=1 w j ln(x j ) denote the primal objective. The duality gap for any pair of primalfeasible x and dual-feasible (nonnegative) y is given by:
Since the primal problem maximizes a concave function over a polytope, the strong duality holds [10] , and therefore G 1 (x, y) ≥ 0 for any pair of primal-feasible x and dual-feasible y, with equality if and only if x and y are primal-and dual-optimal, respectively.
C.2 α-Fair Resource Allocation for α = 1
Recall that for α = 1 the primal problem is:
where y i and z i , for i ∈ {1, ..., m}, are Lagrangian multipliers and slack variables, respectively. The dual to (P α ) can be written as:
where g α (y) = max x,z≥0 L α (x; y, z).
Since L α (x; y, z) is differentiable with respect to x j for j ∈ {1, ..., n}, it is maximized for:
As z i · y i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}, we get that:
Similarly as before, for primal-feasible x and dual-feasible y, the duality gap is given as:
Observing that:
, we finally get: Now assume that x becomes infeasible in some round, and let x 0 denote the (feasible) solution before that round, x 1 denote the (infeasible) solution after the round. We have: A kℓ x 1 ℓ > 1, for some k ∈ {1, ..., m}.
For this to be true, x must have increased over at least one coordinate j such that A kj = 0. For such change to be triggered by the algorithm, it must also be true that:
Since, by the choice of β, this term can increase by a factor of at most 1 + γ/4, it follows that:
This further implies: (x 1 j ) α y k (x 1 )A kj < w j , and since whenever A kj = 0 we also have A kj ≥ 1, we get:
On the other hand, since x 1 j ≥ δ j , δ j α = w j C , and n j=1 A kj x 1 j > 1:
which is a contradiction. Proof of Lemma 4.2. Suppose that max i n j=1 A ij x j < 1 − ε. Then for each y i we have:
Due to Lemma 4.1, we have that x is feasible in every round, which implies that x j ≤ 1 ∀j. This further gives:
and, therefore, all variables x j increase by a factor 1 + β. From Lemma 4.1, since the solution always remains feasible, none of the variables can increase to a value larger than 1. Therefore, after at most τ 0 = min j log 1+β 1 δ j ≤ min j 1 β ln 1 δ j rounds there must exist at least one i such that n j=1 A ij x j ≥ 1 − ε. If in any round max i n j=1 A ij x j decreases, it can decrease by at most β n j=1 A ij x j ≤ β < ε κ . Therefore, in every subsequent round
For the second part of the lemma, let S = {i : n j=1 A ij x j < max k∈{1,...,m} A kj x j − κ−1 κ ε} be the set of constraints that are at least " κ−1 κ ε-looser" than the tightest constraint. Then for i ∈ S we have
This further gives:
A ij x j (from ε ≤ 1/6)
Interchanging the order of summation in the last line, we reach the desired inequality. The proof of the last part is equivalent to the proof of the second part of Lemma 3.2 in [5] and is omitted.
D.2 Decrease of Small Variables
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Suppose that some x j < δ j 1−β triggers a decrease over the j th coordinate. The first part of the Lemma is easy to show, simply by using the argument that at least one term of a summation must be higher than the average:
For the second part, as x j < δ j 1−β , we have that:
Moreover, as y i (x) = C · e κ( n j=1 A ik x k −1) , and C = w j δ j α , it follows that:
Observe that for α ≤ 1:
while for α > 1, since εα ≤ 9 10 :
where we have used the generalized Bernoulli's inequality for (1 − β) α ≥ (1 − αβ) [31] , and then
CmA max ε min j w j , and combining (18) with (19) and (20):
Finally, as C ≥ 2w max nmA max , it follows that
D.3 Potential
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Since Φ is concave, using Fact 4.4 and (4) it follows that:
If x 1 j = x 0 j , then the term in the summation (21) corresponding to the change in x j is equal to zero, and x j has no contribution to the sum in (21) .
If x 1
j − x 0 j > 0, then, as x j increases over the observed round, it must be
By the choice of the parameters,
, and therefore
It follows that 1 −
We get that 1 −
completing the proof.
D.4 Convergence Proof for α < 1
The following lemma appears in a similar form in [5] and is essential for obtaining multiplicative updates of the potential function. We remark that while the proof of the lemma uses similar arguments as [5] , the third part requires an additional result for bounding the potential change due to decrease of small x j 's, that is, x j 's that are smaller than δ j 1−β . Lemma D.1. If α < 1 and Φ 0 , x 0 , y(x 0 ) and Φ 1 , x 1 , y(x 1 ) denote the values of Φ, x, and y before and after a round, respectively, then:
Proof.
It follows immediately from Lemma 4.5 that:
Since each y i is convex, −y i is concave, and applying Fact 4.4, it follows that ∀i :
From the choice of parameters, since every x j can change by at most a factor (1 + β) or (1 − β) over a round, e −κβ y i (x 0 ) ≤ y i (x 1 ) ≤ e κβ y i (x 0 ), and therefore, recalling that β = γ 4(κ+1) , y i (x 1 ) y i (x 0 ) = Θ(1).
Therefore, (25) implies that:
Combining (24) and (26):
Proof of 2. Let S + denote the set of j's such that x j increases in the current round. Then, recalling
≤ 1 − γ and that from the choice of parameters
Since j ∈ S + ,
Observing that for any
< 0, we get:
Proof of 3. Let S − denote the set of j's such that x j decreases in the current round. Note that in this case not all the x j 's with j ∈ S − decrease by a multiplicative factor (1 − β), since for j ∈ S − :
We will first lower-bound the potential increase over x j 's that decrease multiplicatively:
. It follows that:
Next, we prove that the potential increase due to decrease of x j such that {j : j ∈ S − ∧ x 0 j (1 − β) < δ j } is dominated by the potential increase due to x k 's that decrease multiplicatively.
Choose any x j such that {j :
. From Lemma 4.3, there exists at least one i with A ij = 0, such that:
From (30) , there exists at least one p such that A ip = 0 and
Since A ip ≤ A max and for α < 1: δ j ≤ w j 2wmaxmAmax 1/α 1 n 2 < 1 n 2 , it follows that:
Since x 0 p ∈ (0, 1] and α ∈ (0, 1), we have that
n . Using (29) and (32):
Recalling that w j δ α j = C ≥ 2w max nmA max , it further follows that:
Since ε ≤ 1 6 and β = γ 4(κ+1) = ε 16(κ+1) < ε 16 , it follows that 2 1 − ε 2 (1 − β) > 1. Therefore:
Since ξ j ≥ (1+γ) and x 0 p > δp 1−β , it immediately follows that x p decreases by a factor (1−β). Combining this result with (33), (32) , and (28):
Finally, since for j / ∈ S − :
The rest of the convergence results follow by appropriately adapting the results from Section 3.3 in [5] . They are provided here for completeness. Let x t , y(x t ), Φ t denote the values of x, y(x), Φ at the beginning of round t.
of rounds is said to be stationary if for all t ∈ T :
Lemma D.3. During any non-stationary interval T = [t 0 , t 1 ] the potential increases by at least Ω γ 2 κ · (1 − α)p α (x t ) = Ω γ 2 κ · n j=1 w j (x t j ) 1−α for some t ∈ T . Proof. Follows directly from Definition D.2 and Lemma D.1.
Lemma D.4. In any stationary interval T = [t 0 , t 1 ], where t 0 ≥ τ 0 = min j 1 β ln 1 δ j and t 1 − t 0 ≥ τ 1 = max j 1 β ln 1 δ j , x t is a (1 + 6ε)−approximate solution to the α−fair packing problem for all t ∈ T . Proof. The proof is by contradiction and follows a similar line of argument as the proof of Lemma 3.7 in [5] . Let x * denote the optimal solution. Recall that p α (x) = 1
pα(x t ′ ) > 1 + 6ε. Using that T is stationary:
, and therefore:
Since x * is feasible, we have that n j=1 A ij x * j ≤ 1 for all i. Therefore:
Changing the order of summation, and using γ = ε 4 we get:
On the other hand:
The last two inequalities follow from feasibility ( n j=1 A ij x * j ≤ 1), the initial assumption that the interval T is stationary ( t∈T
, and optimality of x * (p(x t ′ ) = 1 r p(x * ) < p(x * ) by the initial assumption). Adding (34) and (35):
Since x * j ∈ (0, 1] ∀j and α ∈ (0, 1), it follows that (x * j ) 1−α ≥ x * j ∀j, and therefore
with positive weights w j x * j n k=1 w k (x * k ) 1−α , such that all the weights sum up to a value that is ≤ 1. Therefore, there must exist at least one j such that:
The first summand in (37) is the value of
in one specific round t ′ ∈ T , while the the second is the sum of the absolute increments over the interval T . It follows that ∀t ∈ T :
and, since x t j ∈ (0, 1] (from feasibility) and α > 0, we have in fact that ∀t ∈ T :
From the algorithm description, x j increases multiplicatively by a factor (1 + β) in each round t ∈ T .
But then after
rounds, it must be x j ≥ 1. Since |T | = t 1 − t 0 > τ 1 , after interval T : x j > 1. But then the solution x becomes infeasible, which is a contradiction (recall Lemma 4.1), and therefore the initial assumption r > 1 + 6ε is not true.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. First, consider the minimum (initial) and the maximum (final) values of the potential Φ.
Recalling that ε ≤ 1 6 :
4n 2 (Amax) 5 , and therefore:
On the other hand, since y i (x) > 0 and x j ∈ (0, 1] for all feasible x:
From Lemma 4.2, after at most τ 0 = O 1 β log 1 max j δ j rounds, there exists at least one i such that j A ij x j ≥ 1 − (1 + 1/κ)ε. Since A ij ≤ A max ∀i, j, it is also true that j x j ≥ 1−(1+1/κ)ε Amax , and as 
Since the potential never decreases, and in each non-stationary interval it increases by a multiplicative factor Ω 1 + = O κ γ 2 (1−α) ln (nA max ) non-stationary intervals, each of length at most τ 1 . Therefore, the total convergence time is at most:
D.5 Convergence Proof for α = 1
The proof outline for the convergence of Algorithm 1 in the α = 1 case is as follows. First, we show that in any round it cannot be the case that only "small-value" x j 's (i.e., x j 's that are smaller than δ j 1−β ) decrease (Lemma D.5). This result implies that in any round in which at least one x j updates (i.e., increases or decreases), at least one update must be due to multiplicative increase or decrease, which provides a sufficient progress in the potential increase (Lemma D.6). Finally, since the total increase in the potential is bounded, we yield a bound on the convergence time, that is, on the number of rounds until
Using the expression for the duality gap (see Eq. 3), we show that after convergence the duality gap is upper-bounded by 7W ε, which further implies additive 7W ε approximation of the solution to which the algorithm converges. Lemma D.5. Whenever some variable x j < δ j 1−β decreases, there exists another variable x l > δ l 1−β that also decreases.
Proof. Fix any round, and let x 0 , y(x 0 ) and x 1 , y(x 1 ) denote the values of x, y at the beginning and at the end of the round, respectively. Suppose that some x 0 j < δ j 1−β decreases. Then from Lemma 4.3 there exists at least one i ∈ {1, ..., m} such that A ij = 0, and:
n . As x j decreases, we must have
Finally, we have that:
and, therefore x 0 p must decrease as well. Since x 0 p > 1− ε 2 nAmax > 11 12nAmax > δp 1−β , the decrease is by a factor of 1 − β, i.e., x 1 p = (1 − β)x 0 p .
Lemma D. 6 . In any round of the algorithm run if there exists at least one j such that
, then the potential increases by at least min k w k Ω(βγ).
Proof. Suppose that in the observed round there exists at least one j such that
. Then x j is either increased or decreased by the algorithm. Let x 0 , y(x 0 ), Φ 0 and x 1 , y(x 1 ), Φ 1 denote the values of x, y(x), Φ before and after the round, respectively. From Lemma 4.5: Lemma 4.5) . Therefore:
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. At initialization, we have that ∀j ∈ {1, ..., n} x j = δ j = w j 2wmaxnmAmax , and therefore ∀i: m j=1 A ij x j = m j=1 A ij δ j ≤ 1 2 . Recalling that ε ≤ 1 6 , we can upper-bound each y i as:
It follows that the initial potential Φ 0 can be lower-bounded as:
As x remains feasible throughout the course of the algorithm, we have that x j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [n]. Noticing that y i (x) > 0 ∀x ∈ R n , we get that Φ(x) ≤ 0 at any point throughout the algorithm execution. Therefore, the maximum total increase in Φ is: ∆Φ = Θ(W ln(nmA max )).
From Lemma D.6, there exists at least one x j with:
potential increases by at least ∆ φ = min k w k Ω(βγ). Therefore, after at most
Recall the expression (3) for the duality gap:
From the second part of Lemma 4.2, after O 1 β ln
Therefore, after O ∆Φ ∆φ rounds:
. Then:
where Γ j (ξ j ) = − ln(ξ j ) + (1 + 6ε)ξ j . Now each function Γ j (ξ j ) is strictly convex in ξ j , and since ξ j ∈ (1 − γ, 1 + γ), we get:
The inequality ln(1 ± γ) ≥ ±γ − γ 2 holds since γ = ε 4 ≤ 1 24 (the inequality is in fact satisfied for any γ ≤ 0.65). Therefore:
Plugging (42) back into (41), and recalling that n j=1 w j = W :
D.6 Omitted Proofs from Section 4.2
The following technical Lemma is used in the proof of Lemma 4.9. Lemma D.7. In any round of the algorithm:
Proof. If x 0 j ≥ δ j 1−β ∀j there is nothing to prove, so assume that there exists at least one j with
The proof proceeds as follows. First, we show that for each j for which x j decreases by a factor less than (1 − β) there exists at least one x p that appears in at least one constraint i in which x j appears and decreases by a factor (1 − β). We then proceed to show that x p is in fact such that x 0
the sum of all the terms corresponding to x j 's with A ij = 0 and x j < δ j 1−β , thus completing the proof. From Lemma 4.3, for each j ∈ S − with x j < δ j 1−β there exists at least one constraint i such that:
Therefore, there exists at least one x p with A ip = 0 such that A ip x 0 p > 1− ε 2 n , which further gives
where the last inequality follows from 1 ≤ A ip ≤ A max and α > 1. Combining the inequality for A ip (x 0 p ) α with the inequality for y i (x 0 ) above:
Using the generalized Bernoulli's inequality: 1 − ε 2 α > 1 − εα 2 and (1 − β) α > (1 − βα) [31] , and recalling that εα ≤ 9 10 , β ≤ γε 4 = ε 2 16 ≤ ε 96 , we further get:
which further implies:
as w p ≤ w max . Since x j decreases,
and therefore x p decreases as well.
Using similar arguments, as
as δ j ≤ 1 2 1/α n 2 mAmax and 2
which further implies the first part of the lemma.
For the second part, consider the following two cases:
Then:
implying the second part of the lemma.
thus implying the second part of the lemma and completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Proof of 1. From Lemma 4.5:
Using the same arguments as in the proof of part 1 of Lemma D.1, we have in fact that 1 −
, which further gives:
If j ∈ S + , then x 1 j = (1+ β)x 0 j , and therefore |x 1
Using part 1 of Lemma D.7:
and using Lemma 4.5:
Using the second part of Lemma D.7 and the fact that for k / ∈ S − :
, we get the desired result:
Proof of 3:
The proof is equivalent to the proof of Lemma D.1, part 2, and is omitted for brevity.
The following lemma shows that in any non-stationary round (defined in Section 4.2) that happens after initial τ 0 rounds the negative potential decreases by a multiplicative factor. Lemma D.8. Let Φ 1 and Φ 0 denote the potential values before and after any non-stationary round that happens after first τ 0 = 1 β min j ln 1 δ j rounds. Then:
Proof. Consider the changes in the potential in any non-stationary round that happens after initial 1 β min j ln 1 δ j rounds. By definition of a stationary round, we have either of the following two cases:
. From the first part of Lemma 4.9, the increase in the potential is:
, then −Φ 0 ≤ n j=1 w j x 1−α j 1 α−1 + 1 , and the increase in the potential is at least:
Recall from Lemma 4.2 that after at most τ 0 = 1 β min j ln 1 δ j rounds it is always true that: 
and n j=1
Since κ = 1 ε ln (CmA max /(min j w j ε)) ≥ 1 ε and ε ≤ 1 6 , it follows that κ(1 − 4ε) ≥ 2, and therefore (using (47)):
From the second part of Lemma 4.9 we have that:
n j=1 x j m i=1 y i (x)A ij , which combined with (46) gives: It follows that:
Recalling that β = γ 4(κ+α) < γ 4α , we have that (1 + β) α ≤ e βα < e γ/4 < 1.04 (as γ = ε/4 ≤ 1/24). Therefore:
Finally, (45), (48), and (49) yield the proof.
The following two technical propositions are used in Lemma D.11 for bounding the duality gap in non-stationary rounds. Proposition D.9. After at most τ 0 = 1 β min j ln 1 δ j rounds it is always true that G α (x, y(x)) ≤ As ξ j > 0, r(ξ j ) is convex for α > 1, and therefore: r(ξ j ) ≤ max{r(1 − γ), r(1 + γ)}. We have that:
Algorithm 2 Stateless α-Fair Resource Allocation
In each round of the algorithm: 1: if x j ∈ [δ j , 1] then 2:
Update prices: y i = C · e κ( n j=1 A ij x j −1) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m} 3 :
x j = x j · (1 + β) 5:
7:
x j = max{x j · (1 − β), δ j } 8: elsex j = max{x j , δ j }, x j = min{x j , 1}
Lemma E.1. If for any i n j=1 A ij x j > 1, then after at most O( 1 β ln(nA max )) rounds we have that it is always true that n j=1 A ij x j ≤ 1. Proof. Suppose that n j=1 A ij x j > 1 for some i. Then y i > C, and for every x j with A ij = 0:
and therefore none of the variables that appear in i decreases. Since n j=1 A ij x j > 1, there exists at least one x k with A ik = 0 such that x k ≥ n j=1 A ij x j A ik n > 1 nAmax . For each such x k , since C ≥ 2nA max :
x α k m l=1 y l (x)A lj ≥ C 1 nA max ≥ 2w max > w k (1 + γ),
and therefore x k decreases (by a factor (1 − β)). As x k ≤ 1, after at most O( 1 β ln(nA max )) rounds, we must have x k ≤ 1 nAmax , and therefore n j=1 A ij x j ≤ 1. Another result that follows as a corollary is that the algorithm reaches a feasible solution after node or constraint insertion/deletion, as long as all the nodes can maintain a proper estimate of the upper bound on n, m, A max , w max . We remark that under minor modifications, the algorithm can run on any non-scaled input, provided that in addition all the nodes have available information about: c = min{1, min k,j:A kj =0 A kj b i }. The pseudocode for the equivalent algorithm (see Appendix A) that can be run on the non-scaled input is given in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Non-scaled Stateless α-Fair Resource Allocation
In each round of the algorithm: 1: if x j ∈ [δ j /c, 1/c] then 2:
Update prices: y i = c α−1 · C · e κ( n j=1 A ij x j −b i) /b i ∀i ∈ {1, ..., m}
x j = x j · (1 + β) x j = max{x j · (1 − β), δ j } 8: elsex j = max{x j , δ j /c}, x j = min{x j , 1/c}
